SingularityNET / ASI bridge keys: ~8.7M FET drained; large unauthorized mints
55M) from the Ethereum TokenConversionManagerV3 path and mint large amounts of AGIX, NTX, WMTx, and CGV. 8M before thin-book prices collapsed.
SingularityNET’s 22 Sep statement: unauthorized cloud access, treasury and exchange wallets not hit, FET in personal wallets or exchanges untouched, bridges and conversions paused, independent review before reopen.
ai said its core contracts were not the break; it paused related conversions as caution. This is key-custody failure on bridge rails, not a random user-wallet drain. Research snapshot from project statements, PeckShield, and Bitquery notes.
369 take
Valid signatures from a stolen bridge key look legitimate on-chain. The break was who held the key.
Pulse lesson for Omnibridge and any converter: hot authorizer keys and unlimited mint/convert paths are the same class as AFX-style deposit rails.
Prefer paused bridges over rushing refill before keys are rotated.
Sources