Maya Protocol: ~$1.7M via chained pool-accounting bugs; network halted
87M CACAO and swap out. 34M class) still sitting in a PeckShield-cited Bitcoin address, plus other assets / on-chain CACAO. Team (Aaluxx) paused global ops.
9M in the event, but most of that is CACAO crashing (~89% at the low) plus arbitrage: do not treat $11M as the amount stolen. SlowMist Hacked lists it 18 Aug. Separate from the THORChain 2026 vault replay.
369 take
A “theft protection” or subsidy path that can credit a pool when the reserve cannot actually pay is an unbacked mint in disguise. Separate what the attacker extracted from the later price crash.
Pulse lesson: any AMM, teleport, or outbound-missing path that writes a new pool balance must fail closed if backing is not there: inherited THOR-style trade-account code still needs its own solvency check.
Sources